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y local scene has changed. I now live in Berkeley, California, after having 
lived in Tuscaloosa, Alabama for almost 30 years. I thought that 
engaging the Anthropocene in a new scene might pose difficulty, since 
most if not all of my ecocritical essays allude to my life in the South, its weather, 
coast, poverty, striking biodiversity, or environmental degradation. But it did not. 
I am now an urbanite: Traffic roils in front of my house almost continuously, even 
on Sunday mornings, and, in the back, a few streets away, trains roll by 
intermittently, horns blaring. When I run or walk to the McLaughlin Eastshore 
State Park and the Berkeley Marina, lovely places affording vistas of San Francisco, 
the Golden Gate Bridge, and Marin County, I cross Interstate 80 on a well-
designed pedestrian bridge, bookended by striking sculptures, one celebrating the 
University of California’s intellectual tradition and Berkeley’s radical tradition, and 
the other celebrating Berkeley’s natural beauty and the recreational opportunities 
the Eastshore State Park offers—birdwatching, kite-flying, biking. Yet as I cross 
that bridge, traffic below me slows to 20 mph at 11 am, even on weekends. Twice 
in the year I’ve lived here, this stretch of Interstate 80 has been closed from 
accidents involving big rigs, backing up traffic for miles and hours, spilling 
frustrated drivers onto the adjacent surface streets, my streets. 
The Eastshore State Park is reclaimed landfill, and the McLaughlin for 
whom it is named was a woman who began her activism in the 1960s, aiming to 
prevent Berkeley from creating more land for development though yet more 
landfill. She succeeded, but in 1966, the population of California was 18 million1; 
in 2016, a half-century later, it is about 39 million.2 Housing prices have risen 
accordingly or, perhaps, more than accordingly. In this city and in many others in 
the San Francisco bay area, and in Los Angeles to the south, thousands upon 
thousands of people live in battered, bruised RVs or cars, and the homeless, lots 
of them, congregate under freeway overpasses and in downtowns and city parks. 
Many in Berkeley live adjacent to that well-designed pedestrian bridge, on both 
sides of—or under—Interstate 80; they live in tents, under lean-tos, beneath tarps, 
in dirty sleeping bags, surrounded by their belongings, and the garbage they 
generate. Some wander up University Avenue, dragging stuff along, begging at 
intersections and bus stops; others rail incomprehensibly about everything—or 
nothing. A Shakespearean might be forgiven for seeing King Lear’s Poor Tom in 
the most ill-equipped, the most deranged, the poorest.  Poor Tom, whose 
discourse, writes Simon Palfrey, “is not socialized as conversation”; Poor Tom, 
whose life is “profoundly removed from objects, human or nonhuman; from the 
pursuit of them or definition through them. And this includes oneself, considered 
M
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as any socially recognizable object.”3 This scene, my Anthroposcene, is 
recognizably and creepily dystopic, despite the visually stunning topography of 
water, hills, mountains, and San Francisco itself. 
In a review of the field of ecocriticism, published in 2011, Lawrence Buell 
observes that “nothing generated within ecocriticism thus far comes close to 
matching intellectual historian Dipesh Chakrabarty’s brilliant short polemic, ‘The 
Climate of History: Four Theses’.” This essay, writes Buell, “reflects on the irony 
of the complex interactions between the rise of post-Enlightenment democratic 
institutions and the advent of what today is increasingly being claimed as the 
Anthropocene Age.”4 What Chakrabarty means, and what Buell thinks ironic, is 
that democracy, individual freedom, and the like—not just capitalism or 
imperialism—require the burning of fossil fuels. Since then, fellow Indian 
intellectuals have offered similarly provocative work, including Srinivas 
Aramaduvan, Amitav Ghosh, and Chakrabarty, too. In “Climate and Capital,” his 
follow-up to “The Climate of History,” Chakrabarty bravely asserts that  
 
Population is often the elephant in the room in discussions of 
climate change. The “problem” of population—while due surely in 
part to modern medicine, public health measures, eradication of 
epidemics, the use of artificial fertilizers, and so on—cannot be 
attributed in any straightforward way to a logic of a predatory and 
capitalist West, for neither China nor India pursued unbridled 
capitalism while their populations exploded.5 
 
Even more audaciously than Chakrabarty, Ghosh confronts the elephant in the 
room in The Great Derangement, suggesting that Asia is no mere victim of climate 
change: “The reality is that the continent has also played a pivotal role in setting 
in motion the chain of consequences that is driving the present cycle of climate 
change.”6 Without dismissing the West’s contribution, which occurred “through 
the continuous expansion of the carbon footprint of what was about 30 percent 
of the world’s population at the beginning of the twentieth century,” Ghosh 
maintains that today’s climate crisis has been precipitated by Asia’s contribution 
through “a period of sustained economic expansion [launched] in the late 1980s.”7 
This was “a sudden but very small expansion in the footprint of a much larger 
group of people, perhaps as much as half of a greatly expanded global population, 
late in the twentieth century” (91).8 Ghosh is then moved to ask, “Could it be that 
imperialism actually delayed the onset of the climate crisis by retarding the 
expansion of Asian and African economies?  Is it possible that if the major 
twentieth-century empires had been dismantled earlier, then the landmark figure 
of 350 parts per million would have been crossed long before it actually was?”.9 
The answer, he thinks, “is almost certainly yes,” and while Ghosh does not think 
acknowledging this truth “diminish[es] the force of the argument for global justice 
regarding greenhouse gas emissions,” this answer is difficult for Western liberal 
intellectual elites to embrace; it causes, I think, too much cognitive dissonance.10 
But in any case, “[t]he heart of the matter,” writes Ghosh, is “numbers”: the 
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any one group of people.11 These contemporary Indian intellectuals are not the 
first to understand this; Mahatma Gandhi wrote in 1928, “God forbid that India 
should ever take to industrialism after the manner of the West . . . it would strip 
the earth bare like locusts.”12 Fossil-fueled growth in Asia at the rate of the past 
thirty years is not sustainable. 
In 2012, PMLA published a cluster of essays on “Sustainability,” 
including one by Steve Mentz, who writes one of the responses to this cluster of 
essays. About sustainability, Mentz is the most grumpy of the contributors, 
asserting from the get-go that “the era of sustainability is over.”13 Others are less 
certain: Stacy Alaimo thinks the concept might be reworked, as do Stephanie 
LeMenager and Stephanie Foote.14 Mentz does not think this possible, because, in 
his view, sustainability, like pastoral, means stasis and what we need are “models 
for thinking about nonstable systems.”15 But, with respect to Mentz, whose work 
I admire very much, I would suggest that sustainability does not mean stasis, 
because in most cases, perhaps almost all, we don’t say “sustainability,” we say 
“sustainable development” or “sustainable growth.” Certainly, I think, we mean 
“sustainable development” or “sustainable growth.” Development or growth, not 
stasis; adjective, not noun. What I emphasize here is not the sustainable but the 
development or, more precisely the growth. Which is not sustainable.16 
This cluster of essays began as a seminar for the Shakespeare Association 
of America, and in our first offerings to each other, Todd Borlik, an eco-historicist, 
posed this question: “how do we trace the origins of the Anthropocene without 
sending a tacit message that our current predicament is simply another episode in 
a millennia-long saga and therefore nothing too worrisome?”17 Recently, I 
discovered in Lapham’s Quarterly a feature called “Déjà Vu: Bringing a historical 
perspective to today’s news,” which implicitly asks the same question: it pairs 
today’s climate change deniers Scott Pruitt and Luther Strange with Aristotle, who 
denied climate change in his Meterology.18 To answer his question, I am sure Borlik 
has an answer, as many of us do. One answer might be (and for the sake of 
argument, I will offer it as my own) that it is unnecessary to trace the origins of 
the Anthropocene, since what we need to do is address “our current predicament,” 
as Borlik puts it, and since we know very well how to address it—reduce our 
carbon footprints immediately and significantly by imposing a carbon tax.  Or to 
put it another way, by changing the way we live. Instead of trying to discover the 
origins of the Anthropocene in the early modern or elsewhere, I suggest that we 
Shakespeareans look to the early modern, to Shakespeare, in order to help us 
discover—or rediscover—different ways of living, of understanding, of defining 
words and concepts, all of which might help us do what we need to do to address 
our current predicament. And so, in what follows, I will consider what 
Shakespeare means by “growth” (and, as a coda, what Shakespeare might mean by 
“need”). An online concordance reveals seventeen uses of “growth” in 
Shakespeare’s oeuvre,19 but not one of them is the specialized use of the word in 
economics, growth in an economy, which use, as the OED notes, does not occur 
until the middle of the 20th century. Needless to say, Shakespeare does not mean 
growth in population, either, given high birth rates and high death rates during the 
early modern period. There was, as we know, effectively no growth either in Gross 
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Domestic Product or population until the industrial revolution. Principally, then, 
Shakespeare’s uses of the word follow the OED’s first definition: “The action, 
process or manner of growing; both in material and immaterial senses; vegetative 
development; increase.” 
Shakespearean growth is physical, inherent, or natural, as Mistress Page 
in The Merry Wives of Windsor suggests when she describes the children who will 
help the wives mock Falstaff—her own son and daughter and “three or four more 
of their growth.”20 Similarly, in As You Like It, Celia wonders whether Rosalind 
knows “how thy name should be hanged and carved upon these trees?”21 Her 
cousin professes not to know and the two engage in a piece of comic questioning, 
in which Rosalind becomes ever more anxious and desperate to know and Celia 
becomes ever more astonished that she does not, given the heavy clues she offers, 
one of which concerns the youth of this man, who “hath but a little beard,” a 
beard whose “growth” she can wait for, Rosalind exclaims, if only Celia will reveal 
the name of this mystery man!22 Earlier in the play and similarly, Le Beau formally 
commends the young men who wrestled Charles; they were “three proper young 
men of excellent growth and presence.”  Now broken, however, they are “with 
little hope of life.”23  Their growth, like all growth, can be thwarted or diverted, as 
these lines by Agamemnon in Troilus and Cressida suggest: 
 
Princes,  
What grief hath set the jaundice on your cheeks?  
The ample proposition that hope makes  
In all designs begun on earth below  
Fails in the promised largeness: cheques and disasters  
Grow in the veins of actions highest rear'd,  
As knots, by the conflux of meeting sap,  
Infect the sound pine and divert his grain  
Tortive and errant from his course of growth.24 
 
And growth can be stopped, as Othello’s meditation on murdering Desdemona 
sadly reveals:  
 
Put out the light, and then put out the light! 
If I quench thee, thou flaming minister, 
I can again thy former light restore 
Should I repent me. But once put out thy light, 
Thou cunning’st pattern of excelling nature, 
I know not where is that Promethean heat 
That can thy light relume: When I have pluck'd the rose,  
I cannot give it vital growth again, 
It needs must wither.25 
 
But in well-known lines opening As You Like It, Orlando may suggest that 




Early Modern Culture 13 
 
 
emotional and ethical.  The younger brother begins the play by complaining about 
Oliver’s treatment of him: 
 
For my part, he keeps me rustically at home, or, to speak more 
properly, stays me here at home unkept; for call you that keeping for 
a gentleman of my birth that differs not from the stalling of an ox? 
His horses are bred better; for, besides that they are fair with their 
feeding, they are taught their manage, and to that end riders 
dearly hir'd; but I, his brother, gain nothing under him but growth; 
for the which his animals on his dunghills are as much bound to 
him as I.26  
 
“Nothing . . . but growth” is what Orlando gains from his brother’s overseeing—
one cannot call it care—of him. In contrasting physical, inherent, and natural 
growth with breeding, training, education, and an awareness of social norms, 
Orlando insists that growth alone is insufficient for “a gentleman of [his] birth.” 
Physical growth requires to be supplemented. In beginning her wooing of Adonis, 
Venus, too, invokes a growth that implies an understanding of and consent to 
social norms. Adonis is duty-bound to reproduce: 
 
Torches are made to light, jewels to wear,  
Dainties to taste, fresh beauty for the use,  
Herbs for their smell, and sappy plants to bear:  
Things growing to themselves are growth's abuse:  
Seeds spring from seeds and beauty breedeth beauty;  
Thou wast begot; to get it is thy duty.27 
 
The Winter’s Tale also implies that growth must be supplemented with breeding, 
training, education, and an understanding of social norms, since, as Time says, the 
wide gap of sixteen years contains much more than physical, inherent, or natural 
growth: 
 
I, that please some, try all, both joy and terror  
Of good and bad, that makes and unfolds error,  
Now take upon me, in the name of Time,  
To use my wings. Impute it not a crime  
To me or my swift passage, that I slide  
O'er sixteen years and leave the growth untried  
Of that wide gap, since it is in my power  
To o'erthrow law and in one self-born hour  
To plant and o'erwhelm custom.28  
 
If, in contrast to growth in GDP or growth in populations or even 
sustainable growth, Shakespearean growth means that which is physical, inherent, 
or natural, and in addition does imply an ethics, an ethics of duty, responsibility, 
relationality, and care, then Shakespearean growth coheres very well with the aims 
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of the Indian intellectuals I have discussed above and with the mostly European 
21st-century environmental and economic movement of degrowth, which is the 
English translation of the French décroissance (and of the Italian decrescita and the 
Spanish decreciminto).  While I can do no more than allude to the movement here—
its antecedents include Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Veblen, Mauss, Polanyi, and 
Illich, among many others, including many from sundry religious traditions—I will 
point out that in its contemporary form, Degrowth dates to 1972’s influential 
report, Limits to Growth, published by the Club of Rome, a global think tank 
established in 1968 that focuses on problems in economics and the environment. 
Founding texts in the movement since then include Fred Hirsch’s Social Limits to 
Growth (1976) and Herman Daley’s Steady State Economics (1977).  French economist 
Serge Latouche and English economist Tim Jackson, among others, have 
continued the work in the last decades of the twentieth century and into this one.  
Jackson published Prosperity Without Growth in 2010 to unexpected acclaim and the 
second edition appeared in 2017, gathering gushing blurbs from Naomi Klein, 
Yanis Varoufakis, Noam Chomsky, among many others, including politicians and 
religious leaders.  
Jackson and his fellow economists know the difficulties they face, since 
for mainstream, neo-classical economists the idea of prosperity without growth, 
of living well without growth, is “complete anathema.”29 Indeed, Jackson 
acknowledges that for most economists as well as certainly most people, 
“abandoning, or being abandoned by, growth is still a frightening prospect.”30 And 
that indeed frightening prospect, I would suggest, explains much about the rise of 
President Donald J. Trump of the United States, who promised to unshackle the 
American economy and deliver 4% growth per annum.  Growth, thinks Trump 
and most of America, is what will make America better, if not great again.  Still, 
degrowth economists, political scientists, and ecologists continue to challenge this 
fear and this mainstream consensus; they ask us to think critically about our 
culture’s assumption, so ingrained as to be automatic, that more is always better.  
Degrowth asks societies to imagine and construct different societies, societies that 
recognize social and ecological limits to economic and population growth and that 
encourage human happiness outside of continual material accumulation, in and 
through, for example, care, craft, practice, leisure, recognition, and relationality.  
But degrowth doesn’t demand only that we make do with less—less 
throughput, less energy, less waste, less stuff. Because even with less, the world 
will enjoy excess; the question for all of us is what to do with surplus, with excess, 
with dépense.  Shakespeare addressed the question, too, in King Lear, in one of my 
favorite speeches.  The speech is Lear’s, addressed to his daughters: 
 
O, reason not the need: our basest beggars 
Are in the poorest thing superfluous: 
Allow not nature more than nature needs, 
Man's life's as cheap as beast's: thou art a lady; 
If only to go warm were gorgeous, 
Why, nature needs not what thou gorgeous wear'st, 
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You heavens, give me that patience, patience I need!31  
 
In Posthuman Lear, and fittingly, given his focus on the play’s deep and compelling 
use of proverbs to manage social and psychological trauma, Craig Dionne wonders 
whether Lear breaks off in mid-sentence in order to find “a proverb to 
communicate what seems obvious to him?  That humans need more than just the 
bare minimum to survive?” For that has been the thrust of this speech, to define 
“‘the human’ as the need for inessential things,” for the symbolic, certainly, but 
also for “reckless spending and wasteful prodigality,” for aristocratic excess or 
expenditure, which it seems, is the play’s nostalgic drive to celebrate.32 The 
problem, Dionne suggests—and it is one that Shakespeare seems to recognize—
is that the argument can be read to mean not that humans differ from animals, but 
that “humans are really animal in the first place.”33 As such, “Lear leaves the 
argument to wander wayward in the Phrygian half-light of the Anthropocene, 
desiring to articulate an absolute symbolics of human immanence, but seemingly 
bound in its relatedness to beasts in the bare world.”34 
Insofar as Lear’s argument breaks down, however, it might be more 
accurate to say that Lear attempts to so define the human.  So, in contrast, Arden 
editor R.A. Foakes thinks Lear’s invocation of “true need” refers to spiritual need:  
Lear shifts from “bodily need, which is scarcely met by the sumptuous clothes 
Regan or Goneril is wearing . . . to spiritual need, the capacity to endure suffering, 
which is beyond calculation.”35 But is this so?  Is Foakes correct?  Or Dionne? I 
agree with Dionne—Lear thinks that what makes us human is excess, excess 
consumption—and I would add that in this attempt, Lear anticipates Georges 
Bataille who, as degrowth proponent Onofrio Romano describes it, sees the 
encounter with excess as that which “qualifies us as ‘human’.”36 Romano thinks 
the encounter with excess “forces human beings to question the meaning of life 
and their path in the world,” which could be spiritual, as Foakes suggests, but 
which also may be merely practical: on what do we spend our excess? On gorgeous 
clothes? A Tesla? One hundred knights? A Rolex? A microwave from Walmart? 
Sexy escorts? Fancy meals? Monuments to the past? Common land? A feast for 
all? Lear, I would suggest, argues himself into a corner, understanding but not 
wanting to acknowledge, to recognize, that “his path in the world,” the meaning 
of his life—articulated in this instance by his hundred knights—is not true need, 
that which separates him from animals, but desire, or want. One might go so far 
as to say that Lear breaks off because he recognizes that what he wants, what he 
desires, is not based on the prerogatives of status, a socially derived positioning in 
society that presumably benefits all, but is personal, individualized. And 
sumptuous clothes, or a Tesla or a Rolex, differ not from one hundred knights. 
Perhaps it is possible that this recognition becomes articulated in Lear’s speech on 
the heath, in the storm: 
 
Poor naked wretches, wheresoe’er you are, 
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm, 
How shall your houseless heads and unfilled sides, 
Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you 
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From seasons such as these?  O, I have ta’en 
Too little care of this. Take physic, pomp, 
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel, 
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them 
And show the heavens more just.37 
 
Slowly since the seventeenth century, and with an acceleration of late, 
almost all of us in the West and increasingly throughout the world, have become 
Lear, privatizing or individualizing the spending of excess, of dépense, and thereby 
denying the demands of the social and the spiritural.  As noted above, Palfrey 
thinks Tom’s is a life “profoundly removed from objects,” even from selfhood, 
and this negation takes him (and Edgar, too) into “rarefied, perhaps saintly 
possibilities.”38  But if so, then Tom can only slimly represent the “homeless 
beggar[s]” of today or even then; “our basest beggars / Are in the poorest thing 
superfluous,” observes the aged King, and the homeless beggars on my streets 
hold stuff and accumulate stuff—cell phones, certainly, and cigarettes or 
marijuana, but abandoned desk chairs, lamps, even vacuum cleaners, too.39  Which 
is to say that despite Tom, or Shakespeare’s achievement in creating him, seldom 
questioned in our culture is the right, the freedom, of each individual, even the 
homeless, the barely-hanging on, to find individually the meaning of life and to 
find it, in particular, through consumption.40  Our current situation describes a 
democratization of the conspicuous and invidious consumption, associated with 
leisure, that once characterized the aristocracy, the priesthood, government, and 
sporting life, as Thorstein Veblen argued over a century ago. Such democratization 
does not make it more appropriate; it offers only more danger and stress to the 
planet.41 Such consumption and competition for status is also what the economics 
of degrowth would undermine, especially the enormous sums, well over 500 
billion dollars in 2017, spent to market and “manipulat[e] our appetites in order to 
stimulate materialistic desire”42: movies, music, video games, professional sports, 
cars, houses, and, well, everything.   
Of course, part of degrowth’s challenge is to unwind the culture that 
promotes growth, status competition, consumption, and materialism and instead 
to promote a culture that consumes and produces less, very much less. 
Constrained by the biosocial limits of the planet, the challenge requires us to 
accept limits, limits to growth, limits to personal expression, limits to 
consumption, even to human reproduction. Degrowth’s challenges are daunting, 
since so far, at least, almost all of us—even ecocritics, environmental humanists, 
humanists, and novelists—have failed these challenges, if we have even 
acknowledged them.43  Each of us gathers more and more objects (Poor Toms we 
are not), consume more and more services—travel, dining, entertainment—but is 
each of us better off, happier? As a society or as communities, we grow bigger and 
bigger: The SAA is bigger and so is the Association for the Study of Literature and 
the Environment. But is society or the community better? Is the SAA better now 
than twenty years ago?  Or the ASLE better now than ten? My sense is that we 
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To conclude, I wish to return to Ghosh’s The Great Derangement, which 
consideration I will introduce by invoking an essay I published in 2001, “On the 
value of Being a Cartoon, in Literature and in Life.” In that essay, I critiqued the 
widespread—and by that point de rigueur—debunking by literary critics of “the 
bourgeois, autonomous, or ‘essentialist humanist’ self.”45 Agreeing with a handful 
of other critics—Graham Bradshaw and Richard Levin among them, neither very 
popular with the debunkers—I added to the critique of the debunking a class-
based rejoinder: “the bourgeois self was, and is, unavailable to most of the people 
living and working in the contemporary world.”46 It was unavailable to my family 
and friends growing up. Unsurprisingly, my critique had little effect on those who 
posited that bourgeois self as universal (even as they also decried the universal), 
but I would like to point out the similarity of my argument then to Ghosh’s in The 
Great Derangement. Like me, Ghosh attacks an article of faith among Western 
academics, including ecocritics, which is that modernity has crushed awareness of 
the “elements of agency and consciousness that humans share with many other 
beings, and even perhaps the planet itself.” Instead, writes Ghosh, most people 
never “lost this awareness in the first place.”47 Furthermore, like my working-class 
people who never experienced the thrill of a bourgeois, autonomous self, Ghosh 
insists that neither were “we. . . all equally captive to Cartesian dualism . . . my 
ancestors were certainly not in its thrall, and even I was never fully acculturated to 
that view of the world.  Indeed, I would venture to say that this is true for most 
people in the world, even in the West . . . . Did anyone ever really believe, pace 
Descartes, that animals are automatons?”48  Although abandoning the fiction of a 
universal bourgeois self or of a universal captivity to Cartesian dualism may be 
problematic for the arguments of some literary critics, recognizing the partiality, 
the narrowness, of these concepts, indeed their class- or ethnic-boundedness, 
should prove generative for accomplishing at least some of the cultural changes—
consuming less, finding prosperity in craft, embracing idleness and leisure—
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